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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
concurring judge advocates, is to ignore the overwhelming number of
cases in which the general rule can be justly applied. It is certainly better
to have a general rule and an exception that can be applied in an extraor-
dinary case, with the burden upon the wife to prove that the gen-
eral rule is inequitable, than to have a rule by which it is necessary for
the husband each time to come in and prove his former wife's remarriage
supplies sufficient reason for an abolishment of the duty to pay alimony.
INSURANCE-DELIVERY TO INSURER'S AGENT HELD
SUFFICIENT WHERE POLICY REQUIRES
ACCEPTANCE BY INSURED
Plaintiff made an application for insurance on February 20, 1948,
through defendant's agent. After plaintiff paid the first year's premium,
his application and a favorable report on his physical condition were
sent to defendant. On March 16, 1948, a policy was issued and mailed
to defendant's agent, at which time the plaintiff was alive and in good
health. On March 17, 1948, the day the agent says the policy was de-
livered to him, plaintiff was found dead as a result of asphyxiation. The
application provided that before the policy was to take effect, it should
be "delivered to and accepted by" applicant. The Superior Court en-
tered judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma, three justices dissenting, with a fourth dissenting in part,
held that since there was an unconditional delivery to the agent, manual
delivery or further acceptance was unnecessary. Mid-Continent Life
Ins. Co. v. Dees, 269 P. 2d 322 (Okla., 1954).
The problem in the instant case revolves around the question of
whether delivery to the agent of the insurer constitutes delivery to the
insured. Before attempting to analyze the problem, it is important to
determine how the courts define delivery. In the case of Harris v.
Regester' the court defined delivery as a transfer of possession or con-
trol of the policy to the insured. This interpretation has been clarified
to mean that the intention of the parties as to when delivery is to take
effect controls, and not the manual possession of the policy.2 The court
in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith3 held:
Where there is an intention on the part of the insurer to part with the con-
trol of the policy, and to place it in the control of the insured or some person
acting for him, that is sufficient to constitute delivery. 4
170 Md. 109, 16 At. 386 (1889).
2 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 129 Miss. 544, 91 So. 456 (1922).
3Ibid.
4 Ibid., at 546 and 458.
CASE NOTES
Upon concluding that the intention of the parties is the controlling
factor, it is apparent that the crux of the matter lies in the construction
of the delivery provisions in the insurance contract. The courts must
determine whether the parties intended to have a manual delivery before
the policy became operative, or whether mere constructive delivery was
contemplated. Be that as it may, the overwhelming weight of authority
holds, regardless of what the contract provides (excepting an express
provision requiring manual delivery), that where nothing remains to
be done by the applicant, an "unconditional" delivery by the insurer
to his agent is sufficient delivery; it evidences an intention of the in-
surer to put the policy out of its control and into the control of
the insured.5 Although this general rule is useful as a guide, it does not
solve the problem of how to determine when an unconditional delivery
exists; it merely supplies the answer once there has been such a deter-
mination. The courts are still faced with the problem of deciding whether
the words "delivery," "actual delivery," or "delivery to and received
by," constitute conditions precedent to the policy's taking effect. It is
upon the construction of such words that the decisions of the courts
differ.
In the cases to be discussed, all conditions precedent, such as the pay-
ment of the first premium, have been disposed of. The only question in-
volved is resolving the parties' intention as to when delivery is to take
effect under the provisions of the insurance contract.
The weight of authority favors the view that delivery provisions
do not establish conditions precedent. In the case of New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Baker,6 the provision in the application required that the policy
be "delivered to and received by" the applicant before the policy takes
effect. Two days prior to insured's death, the insurer approved and
mailed the policy to its agent. The court, in allowing recovery, held
that the case fell within authorities holding that delivery is satisfied
when the insurer executes and mails the policy to its agent notwithstand-
ing the provision requiring "delivery to and receipt by" the applicant
of the policy before it became effective. The decision was based on the
fact that there was no condition left to be performed by the applicant.
The provision in the policy under consideration in the case of Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Otto7 required that there be an "actual delivery" before
insurer be bound. The policy was mailed to the insurer's agent for un-
conditional delivery, but before manual transmission could be made, ap-
plicant was accidently killed. The court held that there had been an
"actual delivery" within the provision in the contract since the agent,
5 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, 284 Fed. 707 (C.A. 9th, 1922).
6 33 F. 2d 434 (C.A. 7th, 1929). 7 153 Md. 179, 138 Ad. 16 (1927).
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having completed his duty for the insurer, was acting on behalf of the
applicant. In the case of Glover v. New York Life Ins. Co.,8 the policy
required a "delivery" during the lifetime and good health of the appli-
cant. The insurer accepted and mailed the policy to its agent for un-
conditional delivery to applicant. While the policy was at the post office
of the agent, applicant took sick and died. The court held that there
was a delivery even though the policy was never "received" by the
insured during his lifetime and good health since manual delivery was
not intended.
In the majority of cases which hold that delivery has not been complied
with by mere transfer of the policy to the agent of the insurer, it ap-
pears that some condition precedent, other than that of delivery of the
policy, existed which was not satisfied. However, there are a number of
cases which hold that "delivery" or "actual delivery" are conditions
precedent which cannot be complied with by mere constructive delivery.9
The policy, in the case of Ellis v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.,10
required that it be "actually delivered" to applicant during his lifetime
and good health. The court held that a policy, which was received by
the local agent on the evening before, or the morning of the day of the
applicant's death from an accident, was not delivered to the applicant
where the agent was instructed not to deliver the policy until he had
ascertained whether the applicant was alive and in good health. The
requirement of "actual delivery" was held to be a condition precedent
to any liability on the part of the insurer. Here then is a case where the
court held that delivery was not complied with, not merely because of
the "delivery" provision in the policy, but because something remained
to be done by insurer's agent.
In Carpenter v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co." the applicant was accidentally
killed a few hours after the insurer's agent received the policy. Relying
on a provision in the contract requiring a "delivery" the court held
that delivery to the agent was not delivery of the policy, and therefore
no completed contract existed. This case is a perfect example of those
holding that "delivery" of itself is a condition precedent requiring a
manual delivery as fulfillment of the contract.
The contention has often been made that the insurer's agent has no
capacity to receive delivery for the insured. Courts have found several
ways of dismissing this contention as is pointed out in the Otto case,
where the court said that delivery to the agent is delivery to the insured
8 27 Ga. App. 615, 109 S.E. 546 (1921).
0Young v. Intersouthern Life Ins. Co., 74 Ind. App. 329, 128 N.E. 940 (1920);
De Hann v. Marvin, 331 Mich. 231, 49 N.W. 2d 148 (1951); Farris v. Allstate Inc.,
265 S.W. 2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954).
10206 Il1. App. 226 (1917). 11212 Mo. App. 336, 246 S.W. 623 (1923).
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•.. because in such a case the agent is but a minister or vehicle to transmit the
written evidence of the contract just as the mails or any other public mes-
senger would be. Whether he be called a trustee, a custodian, or an agent, and
in a sense he is all three, is immaterial .... 12
In the instant case, the fact that distinguishes it from the great multi-
tude of similar cases is the additional requirement that the policy be
"accepted" by the applicant before the contract takes effect. The exact
provision in the application states:
... That the Company shall not incur any liability upon this application until
the policy has been issued by the Company and the first premium has actually
been paid to and accepted by the Company or its authorized agent and the
policy has been delivered to and accepted by me during my lifetime and good
health.
The majority of the court dealt lightly with this question and passed
over it quickly by merely stating that the mailing of the policy to the
agent unconditionally while insured was in good health and alive, con-
stituted delivery in law, manual delivery, or further acceptance being
unnecessary. The majority reiterated the general rule and stated that
though it was the court's first occasion to apply it, the rule has been
applied many times in other jurisdictions.la The only case reviewed by
the majority was Republic National Life Ins. Co. v. Merkley. 1 4 In that
case there was an application for insurance on June 21. The premium
was paid on July 1, and the policy approved and mailed on July 3. On
July 4, the applicant died. The provision in the policy required that the
policy be "delivered to and received by" the insured. The court held
that a policy is "constructively delivered" when it is mailed to an agent
unconditionally and for the sole purpose of delivering it to insured, even
though the agent does not actually deliver the policy to the insured,
and notwithstanding a stipulation that insurance should not take effect
unless the policy was "delivered to and received by" insured during his
lifetime. The majority concluded with the statement that it would be a
waste of time to further discuss the authorities so holding.
The dissent, however, was not as anxious to dispose of the question. It
is their opinion that something remained to be done before the policy
became effective, that something being acceptance by the assured. Their
reason for so concluding is based on a literal interpretation of the con-
tract. To justify this conclusion, the dissent quoted a statement from
12 153 Md. 179, 181, 138 At. 16, 18 (1927).
13 Republic Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Merkley, 59 Ariz. 125, 124 P. 2d 313 (1942);
Acacia Mut. Life Ass'n. v. Berry, 54 Ariz. 208, 94 P. 2d 770 (1939); Unterharnscheidt
v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 223, 138 N.W. 459 (1912).
14 59 Ariz. 125, 124 P. 2d 313 (1942),
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Corpus Juris Secundum15 to the effect that provisions in the policy re-
quiring delivery are reasonable, binding and enforceable. It is further
illustrated that such provisions are for the benefit of the insurer,", and
since the insurer has the right to say when its liability will commence,
their risk should not be enlarged contrary to such provision.
There are two cases relied on by the dissent in support of its con-
clusion. In the case of Klein v. Farmers' and Bankers' Life Ins. Co.,17 the
application provided that no liability should attach to the company until
the policy was "delivered to and received by" the applicant while in
good health. The agent refused to deliver the policy when he learned
that applicant was suffering from a disease which evidently was con-
tracted subsequent to the medical examination. The court refused re-
covery on the grounds that the provision requiring delivery was never
complied with. The other case relied on by the dissent was Pruitt v.
Great Southern Life Ins. Co.' In that case the agent had received the
executed policy on the day before the applicant died. The application
provided that the contract should not take effect until the printed policy
had been "actually delivered to and accepted by" the applicant while
in good health. In denying recovery, the court held:
It seems obvious to us that it was the intention of the parties to reserve unto
themselves the right to repudiate the contract up until the moment of its con-
summation. The insured could repudiate the contract even after the policy
was physically placed in his hands by merely refusing to accept it. The in-
surer could repudiate the contract at any time up until it was delivered to the
insured, and even then if he was found to be in ill health at any time since he
made his application for insurance.19
The concluding remark in the dissent was to the effect that to allow
recovery would necessitate a disregard of plain words and the making of
a new and different contract for the parties.
This case illustrates just how far the courts are willing to go to "bal-
ance the equities." Although the majority of courts are apparently of
the opinion that delivery provisions in insurance contracts border on
being against public policy because of the unfair advantage assumed by
the insurance companies, this consideration has not been strong enough
to induce the courts to make a direct frontal attack.
15 44 C.J.S., Insurance § 265 (1945).
16Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Trumbly, 170 Okla. 639, 41 P. 2d 913 (1935);
Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. House, 156 Okla. 285, 10 P. 2d 718 (1932).
17 132 Kan. 748, 297 Pac. 730 (1931).
18 202 La. 527, 12 So. 2d 261 (1942).
19 Ibid., at 529 And 263.
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By refusing to declare such provisions void as against public policy,
courts have left it within their power to decide each case on the equities
involved. If the equities favor the insurance company, a literal interpre-
tation of the provision will be deduced, thereby requiring manual de-
livery. Otherwise, the provision will be interpreted liberally and con-
structive delivery will suffice.
NEGLIGENCE-UNQUALIFIED DUTY REASONABLY TO
INSPECT BEFORE SALE IMPOSED ON
USED CAR DEALERS
The defendant, a seller of used cars, sold an automobile with defective
brakes. The auto went out of control because of this defect, while being
driven by the buyer. Plaintiff, a third party, sustained injuries from the
accident, for which he brings this action against the vendor. Verdict
was rendered for the seller; plaintiff moved for a new trial which was
granted; on retrial, a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and
seller appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the trial court.
In affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, with
three justices dissenting, held that a dealer in used automobiles must
exercise reasonable care in inspecting an automobile before sale; also,
the tort liability of a dealer in used automobiles is based on foreseeability
of injury to others, arising from his actions or failure to act, and does
not depend on the dealer's representations, or knowledge of the defective
condition. Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W. 2d 627 (Ky., 1954).
The liability of a supplier of chattels to a third person not in privity
of contract for damages resulting from defects in the chattel has been a
field of much adjudication. Initially, it was held that the breach of a
contract gave no cause of action for damages to a party not in privity.1
This rule was extended to actions in tort, and the general rule developed,
that the original seller is not liable for damages caused by defects to
anyone except to his immediate buyer.2 Although some exceptions to
the rule developed, it was the general rule until 1916 when Judge Car-
dozo laid down the modern rule in the leading case of McPherson v.
Buick Motor Company.8 This decision placed the duty upon a manu-
facturer to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of chattels which,
if negligently made, became dangerous instrumentalities. The majority
of the courts have adopted this rule to impose a duty of reasonable care
1 Vinterbottom v. Wfright, 10 A . & 1,V. 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415 (1842).
2 Prosser, Torts § 83 (1941).
.1217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
